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Introduction 
This paper starts from a problem that is perhaps better expressed as a 
contradiction. On the one hand ‘Knowledge’ has undoubtedly become 
the major organizing category in the educational policies of international 
organisations and many national governments. Global similarities are 
increasingly apparent- whether they are expressed with reference to 
knowledge itself, to the knowledge society, to knowledge workers or The 
Knowledge Promotion 
(http://www.utdanningsdirektoratet.no/templates/udir/TM_Artikkel.aspx?id=2
376) as the recent reforms of Norwegian secondary education are referred 
to.  On the other hand the category ‘knowledge’ appears to be used in an 
almost entirely rhetorical way; the meaning of knowledge is at best 
implicit1 and at worst virtually empty of content. One consequence is 
that  such policies deny or disregard the idea that access to knowledge in 
the strong sense that involves its claims to reliability is central to the 
                                                        1 As in the case I recently came across of  a lawyer whose new post was Head of Knowledge.   
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whole purpose of education.  Thus, what I shall refer to in this paper as 
the ‘voice of knowledge’(Moore 2007)  as a distinctive factor shaping 
educational policy, is lost.  If I have accurately identified this trend and it 
continues, it is a highly problematic heritage that we leave to future 
generations-namely that there is no explicit knowledge that it is 
important enough to be ‘transmitted’ to the next generation.  It is a 
heritage that has none of the visibility of the environmental or 
sustainability crises, although arguably, addressing it is fundamental to 
whether we are able to deal with either.   
 
The aim of this paper is to explore this apparent contradiction and to 
begin to develop an alternative that takes the idea of the  ‘voice of 
knowledge’ seriously.  An issue that I touch on, but only by implication, 
is whether significant strands of the social sciences (and sociology in 
particular) may be part of the problem of denying a ‘voice’ for 
knowledge rather than being the basis for  offering a viable alternative 
for the future(Young and Muller 2007: 2009).  
 
The paper has five sections. Section 1 provides a number of examples of 
how knowledge is interpreted in international educational policies and 
raises the question “why knowledge”?  What purpose does such a focus 
on knowledge have in today’s educational policies?  My examples are 
drawn from the educational policies of international organizations such 
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as the World Bank and new national curricula and national education 
policies- (my illustrations are from Norway and England). I also refer 
briefly to the work of the Portuguese sociologist, Buoaventura de Sousa 
Santos, a leading critic of globalization, to indicate the terms within 
which the debate about education and the knowledge economy among 
globalisers and anti-globalisers has largely been set.  My argument is 
that, despite treating knowledge as a main organizing category, 
international and national policy makers and their critics in effect by-
pass what I (following Rob Moore) mean by the ‘voice of knowledge’.  
 
Section 2 begins to make explicit what the idea of the ‘voice of 
knowledge’ in educational policy might mean.  It starts from a paper by 
Moore (Moore 2006) in which he draws on the critical realist tradition in 
the philosophy of science and establishes the epistemological basis for 
the idea of the  ‘voice of knowledge’ in education. However, in my view, 
despite its strengths,  critical realism does not move us very far towards 
conceptualising a more adequate role for  knowledge in educational 
policy.  
 
Section 3 builds on Moore’s ideas by arguing that the key idea implicit 
in a realist theory of knowledge is knowledge differentiation.  This idea 
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is elaborated through a brief account2 of the ideas of the French 
philosopher, Gaston Bachelard .  Section 4 considers the educational 
implications of the idea of the social differentiation of knowledge with 
reference to the work of Durkheim, Vygotsky and Bernstein.  Section 5 
builds on Section 4 to explore five forms of knowledge differentiation as 
they apply to the curriculum.  Section 6 concludes the paper by returning 
to the idea of the ‘voice of knowledge’ as a shaper of educational policy.   
 
 
 
                                                        2 My account draws on  Christopher Norris’s Norris’s (Norris 2000:2005) excellent accounts of  Bachelard’s ideas.  
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 Knowledge as the new global narrative  
The striking thing about the many publications of international 
organizations and governments that refer to knowledge and the 
knowledge economy is that they don’t feel the need to ask the question 
‘What is this knowledge that we are referring to?”; its meaning is simply 
taken for granted.  As Susan Robertson (Robertson 2007) puts it in a 
recent paper which started me thinking about this issue- “Who can be 
against knowledge?”  It is not therefore surprising, she writes, “that the 
idea of knowledge articulates with the left as well as the right” .  In UK 
terms this use of ‘knowledge’ is an example of a characteristic New 
Labour or ‘third way’ doctrine- it includes everything, it sounds 
progressive (or at least modernizing) but it says nothing substantive.  
 
It is the word knowledge, rather than the  related term ‘information’ that 
has caught on as the key category in the new education policy literature.  
I suspect that the reason for this is that, despite its multiple meanings and 
absence of any referents, the word knowledge does retain a public 
association with ideas such as certainty, reliability, and objectivity and 
even truth.  Reference to knowledge therefore provides a kind of 
authority for policies that do not have to be justified in other ways. The 
authority of the term knowledge is taken over but not the basis of its 
claims.  
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A brief glance at documents produced by international organizations  and 
governments indicates that the idea of knowledge acts as a license for a 
whole range of educational policies that have little directly to do with 
knowledge in the more specifically epistemological  sense.  Two  
examples of widely supported educational policies illustrate this point. 
The first is the emphasis on maximizing learner choice and the 
associated tendency for learning to become little more than another form 
of consumption. In a world dominated by  learner choice knowledge 
looses all its authority. The second example is the popularity of the 
slogans  ‘personalized learning’ and  ‘individual learning styles’ and the 
gradual replacement of the terms education, school and college  with 
their assumed elitism by learning and learning centres.   This is not to 
underplay the importance of learners having an active role in any 
educational process as any level. It is rather to highlight the importance 
of  distinguishing between  the everyday or common sense  knowledge 
that is acquired by individual learners in specific contexts and the idea 
that  we acquire powerful knowledge (Young 2009) to take us beyond 
our everyday experiences.( Karpov and Heywood 1998) . If this 
distinction is blurred or seen as unimportant,  the  role of teachers is 
reduced to little more than  facilitation and support and we are not a 
million miles away from the idea of ‘user-generated knowledge’ that is 
associated with YouTube and Facebook(Keen 2007).   
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My argument is that  an empty and rhetorical notion of knowledge and 
the increasing tendency to  blurr distinctions between the production of 
knowledge and its acquisition and between knowledge and skills –the 
latter unlike the former  being something measurable and targetable- 
becomes a way of denying a distinct ‘voice’ for knowledge in education.  
Furthermore excluding such a ‘voice’ from educational policy most  
disadvantages those learners (and whole societies, in the case of 
developing countries), who are already disadvantaged by circumstances 
beyond the school.  
 
Illustrations of this ‘emptying of content” can be found in the 
educational policies of many countries; I will mention two briefly- 
England and Norway. Since the end of the 1980s, but increasingly in the 
last decade the control of public education in England has been 
centralized under the Department of Education and Skills(DFES). 
Schools, Local Authorities, Examination Boards and research councils 
have increasingly taken on the role of agencies delivering government 
policy.  The DFES, now two departments- the Department of  
Innovation, Universities and Skills( DIUS) and the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families(DCSF), like all government 
Departments, are now regulated under a Public Service Agreement 
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(PSA) which governs the funds they receive from the Treasury3.  The 
PSA for Education has five objectives broken up into 14 sub–objectives.  
All refer to generic targets and none make reference to any specific  
knowledge or curriculum content.  Another illustration that is more 
obviously  closer to what goes on in schools and colleges comes from the 
requirements laid down by the government for the new diplomas for 14-
18 year olds. (http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/14-
19/index.cfm?go=site.home&sid=52). These requirements set out in 
considerable detail the packaging, module combinations, credit levels 
and pathways for the diplomas, but make only minimal reference to 
content.  Targets which are based on a common set of levels, and 
common units for measuring volume of learning have priority over 
reference to specific contents.  The implications are that what might be 
assumed to be distinctive to formal education- the acquisition of specific 
knowledge- is treated as relatively unimportant.  Institutions are held 
accountable and students assessed in terms of outcomes that are not 
content-specific.  
 
The new Norwegian4 curriculum reforms follow a similar trend.  They 
                                                        3 I am grateful to Professor Alison Wolf( Kings College, University of London) for pointing out to me the important role of Public Service Agreements and their potential influence on what counts as successful learning in school.   4 I mention Norway for two reasons; one is that I have recently visited two Norwegian universities and the other because Norway has often been celebrated by English researchers as representing a model of strong educational policy making (Payne.J 2002) . My point is not to disagree with Payne but to suggest that this 
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are known, significantly, as The Knowledge Promotion(op cit for 
website reference) ; the new Norwegian  curriculum is defined by five 
basic skills and a seven-part  quality framework; each of the twelve 
criteria  have to be reflected in the teaching of the different subjects;  
subject syllabuses no longer prescribe specific  contents.  It is this 
combination of basic (generic) skills and a quality framework, not the 
knowledge content of subjects which is built into the legislation,  drives 
teaching, and defines what students have opportunities to learn, and how 
they are assessed,  
 
A rather different example  of the evacuation of knowledge,  is found in 
the publications of the radical  Portuguese sociologist, Buoventura de 
Sousa Santos, now largely based at Wisconsin. It illustrates how the 
approach taken to knowledge by at least some the Left-wing critics of 
globalization and the role of international agencies  leads to a similar 
evacuation of content.  De Sousa Santos works are widely read in Brazil 
and he has played a key role in the  Global Social Forum. In Brazil I 
have heard him spoken of as the new Paulo Freire.  What he refers to as  
his “epistemology of absent knowledges” claims to goes beyond what he 
sees as the ‘blindness’ of western science.  He refers to it in a paper in 
the European Journal of Social Theory in the following terms:                                                         ‘emptying of knowledge content’ under the guise of promoting knowledge can be found even in a country as little  prone to ‘marketising’ and ‘individualising’ tendencies as Norway.   
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“the epistemology of absent knowledges starts from the 
premise that social practices are knowledge practices… 
nonscience-based practices, rather than being ignorant 
practices, are practices of alternative rival knowledges.  
There is no apriori reason to favour one form of knowledge 
against another.”Sousa de Santos 2001)  
 
Starting from a critique of mainstream economics, de Sousa Santos is 
trapped in a framework that associates epistemologies with particular 
social groups or world regions. The result is a concept of knowledge that 
equates it over-simplistically with power5, and is as empty, despite its 
radical rhetoric, as that of the World Bank.  
 
The ‘Voice of Knowledge’ 
What then might the idea of the ‘voice of knowledge’ that I have argued 
is increasingly absent in educational policies mean?  I begin with what 
Moore (Moore 2007) identifies as its four elements:  
 
It must, he argues be:   
                                                         5 Of course ,knowledge is about power and ‘the powerful ‘ will always try to define what counts as knowledge. However it is not only about power; some types of  knowledge are more reliable than others and we cannot afford to forget either aspect.  
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1. critical- be open to revision and embody a fallibilist notion of truth 
2. emergentist- in recognizing that knowledge is not reducible to the 
conditions of its production or the activities and interests of those 
involved 
3. realist- in recognizing that the objects of knowledge of both the 
natural and social worlds are realities that (a) are independent of our 
perception of the world and (b) provide limits to how we can know about 
the world  
4. materialist- in recognizing that knowledge is produced (and acquired) 
in specific historically created modes of production, or in Bourdieu’s 
terms, intellectual fields.  
 
Knowledge, it follows, from a realist perspective and in the sense that  I 
as an educationalist use the word6,  can be differentiated from the  
meanings we construct to make sense of the word in our everyday lives; 
it  is not created by learners or even by learners with their teachers; it is 
acquired.  
 
Although these propositions form a sound basis for any serious enquiry 
into the role of  knowledge in education, the terms in which they are set 
are too general for them  to be a basis on their own, for drawing any 
                                                        6 It is what I and I imagine most teachers (and parents) want their students/children to acquire at school  that they will be unlikely to be able to acquire at home.   
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conclusions about educational and more specifically, curriculum policy.   
I will comment briefly on each proposition and suggest that the key 
underlying concept that can be derived from them and needs developing 
is the differentiation of knowledge.  
 
Proposition 1 refers to fallibility.  The idea of fallibility or ‘openness to 
critique and revision’ is usually associated with the natural sciences. 
However it is no less important in the humanities and social sciences. 
Different concepts of fallibility arise from the ways in which different 
knowledge domains subsume the particular under the general (Joe 
Muller and I discuss this in an earlier paper(Young and Muller 2007). 
However fallibility is always understood as being  ‘within a tradition or a 
discipline’ The dangers of breaking the link between ‘openness to 
critique’ and a tradition within which critique is located  are well 
demonstrated by Anthony Kronman, the former Dean of Humanities at 
Yale. In his book Education’s Ends: Why have American universities 
given up on the meaning of life? (Kronman 2007)  Kronman  
describes how after the 1960s many  humanities Faculties in the USA 
rejected any notion of tradition and focused only on critique; this left 
them, he argues,  open to the most extreme forms of  relativism  and 
political correctness. 
 
Proposition 2 refers to Emergence- This is the idea that powerful 
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knowledge is the product of social conditions or contexts that do not 
wholly determine it.  Examples might be the science laboratory or the 
classroom. Archives, libraries and the internet can also  be conditions for 
the emergent properties of knowledge to be generated. However this 
does not take place,  as is sometimes assumed,  in isolation from teachers 
or members of other ‘communities of specialists’.  These originating 
‘contexts’ will leave their mark on the knowledge acquired and produced 
in them.  However what makes powerful knowledge’ powerful is its 
independence or autonomy from the specific contexts of its origin.  Let’s 
take an example;  the English chemist Robert Boyle needed to be 
wealthy enough to build the laboratory on his estate in which he 
discovered what became known as Boyles Law.  However today’s 
aircraft designers do not need to read Steven Shapin’s account of the 
gentry culture (Shapin 1995) of which Boyle was a part to understand 
and apply his Law about how gas volumes change under pressure.  
 
Emergence is a less straightforward idea in the social sciences.  For 
example, Max Weber’s concept of ideal types has emergent properties 
which explains why it remains fruitful to this day. However only a few 
sociologists will be familiar with the debates Weber had with the 
Marxists in the German Social Democratic Party which led him to 
formulate the idea. Contemporary sociologists could well gain additional 
sociological  insights into Weber’s ideas by reading Marianne Weber’s 
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account of his life in ways that would not be true for physicists reading 
Shapin’s account of Boyle’s life, however interesting they might find it.  
 
Proposition 3 refers to the real basis of knowledge;  in other words that 
our claims to knowledge are not just claims; they say something about 
the world that is not dependent on how we conceive of it.  If the 
sociology of knowledge is to say anything about the curriculum it must 
provide a theory that distinguishes between knowledge and non-
knowledge-whether this is expressed as experience, opinion, belief or 
common sense.  Likewise, if the nature of the objects of knowledge(our 
theories)  limits what we can know about reality, we need to know how 
they are differentiated between different domains when we come to 
make decisions about the curriulum.  
 
 
Proposition 4 refers to the materiality of knowledge production and 
acquisition- that these processes do not take place anywhere but  in 
particular social contexts with specific rules and forms of organisation.  
This idea of the materiality of knowledge production points to the 
importance of research into different forms of specialist knowledge 
communities and their role (and often their  lack of role) in the design of 
curricula.  In the UK, vocational education programmes preparing 
students for different occupational fields vary widely in how they 
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interpret their knowledge base.  Much of this variation can be explained 
in terms of the different roles that professional associations have in the 
design of programmes at pre- or non-professional levels7.  
 
The  conclusion that I draw from this brief discussion of  Moore’s four 
propositions about knowledge is that they have to be developed further.    
One way of doing this is through the idea, implicit in each proposition, 
that knowledge is socially differentiated.  Section 3 draws on the French 
philosopher, Gaston Bachelard’s historical epistemology to present an 
way of developing this idea.  
 
The social differentiation of knowledge 
The idea that there are real structured differences between types of 
knowledge that are not dependent on our perceptions- in particular 
between scientific and non-scientific knowledge-  lies at the heart of the 
work of Gaston Bachelard,  the French philosopher of science. In the UK 
his work has been largely  associated with Louis Althusser’s flawed 
attempt to construct a ‘scientific’ Marxism.  However, and here I draw 
largely on Christopher Norris’s account, this is to miss the broader 
importance of Bachelard’s work.   Norris (Norris 2000) points out,                                                         7 One of the most successful programmes of vocational education in England (in terms of progression both  to employment and to higher education and professional level programmes) is that developed by the Association of Accountancy Technicians(AAT). A major reason for this is the key role played by the professional association of Chartered Accountants(The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales) with which the AAT is associated.  
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rightly, I think, that Althusser, presumably for political reasons, 
misinterprets Bachelard and relied on 
“a misplaced ‘scientific’ rigour that seeks to emulate the physical 
sciences in fields where different criteria apply”  
This habit, Norris argues, gives rise to “various kinds of false analogy 
and wire-drawn metaphors” which find no justification in Bachelard’s 
own work.  Furthermore, Bachelard’s epistemology is more historically 
grounded than that of critical realists such as  Bhaskar; it focuses on 
distinct episodes in the history of the physical sciences.  For this reason  
it is more useful for  clarifying what the ‘differentiation of knowledge’ 
might mean in sociological terms.   
 
The following points are a necessarily over-simplified summary of the 
aspects of Bachelard’s theory of knowledge which have particular 
relevance for the concerns of this paper; they are drawn largely from 
Norris’s discussions8: 
 
 • Bachelard establishes a basis for distinguishing science from pre-(or 
non)science that has parallels with Lakatos’s distinction between 
‘progressive’ and ‘degenerating’ research programmes.  
 • he has a theory of how knowledge progresses from ‘less efficient’ 
                                                        8 A much more detailed account of Bachelard’s epistemological theory is given by Mary Tiles (Tiles 1984) and by Christina Chimisso(2001) who locates her account in the context of Bachelard’s work as a whole.  
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to ‘more efficient’ concepts through the process of “conceptual 
rectification and critique” 
 • he provides examples from the history of science of how 
knowledge ‘progresses’ by tracing the discontinuous development of   
ideas such  as the ‘atom’ from the Greeks ‘atomism’ to modern 
atomic theory. In each case he shows how ideas are transformed from 
being largely metaphorical  into increasingly  precise and testable 
‘scientific’ concepts.  
 • he recognizes that a theory of knowledge must begin from ‘the 
current best state of knowledge in the field concerned’- in other words 
where a discipline is currently at.  
 • he proposes a methodology for  distinguishing  between two kinds 
of historical enquiry which Norris argues are often confused in 
contemporary discussions- histoire sanctionee-the history of the 
growth of science ( this focuses on those early steps, like Lavoisier’s 
discovery of the role of oxygen in combustion,  which led to further 
advances)  and histoire perimee- the history of past scientific beliefs( 
those which were later  rejected as leading nowhere. One of 
Bachelard’s examples in this case  was Priestley’s  attempt to explain 
combustion with the idea of  phlogiston  .  
 • his historical epistemology is underpinned by a trans-historical set 
of principles associated with  rigour, clarity, conceptual precision and 
logical consistency.  
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None of these proposals can be easily applied to the social sciences9 and 
I am not aware of any attempt by Bachelard to extend his theory beyond 
the physical sciences10. However his focus on the historical conditions 
for the growth of knowledge in any discipline does not imply that it must 
be restricted to the physical sciences or that  the idea of a historical 
epistemology must take physics or any particular science as its model. 
Also for Bachelard concepts are not just theoretical propositions; they 
are simultaneously embedded in technical and pedagogic activity- the 
material conditions for producing them. Thus he opens the possibility of  
a realist account of the differentiation and growth of knowledge and the 
role of educational institutions.  
 
Approaches to the social differentiation of knowledge- Durkheim, 
Vygotsky and Bernstein  
This section takes further the idea of knowledge differentiation by 
drawing briefly on the three theorists who focuses specifically on the 
differentiation of educational knowledge- Durkheim and Vygotsky and 
Bernstein. Their analyses form the basis, I suggest,  for a research 
programme into the differentiation of educational knowledge as the                                                         9 Althusser’s failed attempt to apply Bachelard’s proposals to Marxism as a theory of capitalism and his use of Bachelard’s  idea of an ‘epistemological break’ are an illustration of the difficulties.  10 George Canguilhem,  who succeeded  Bachelard at the Sorbonne, developed an influential historical epistemology with a focus on biology. However I have not considered his work in this paper.  
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principles for a theory of the curriculum. The significance and range of 
work  of the three theorists is only touched on briefly here. I have 
explored their ideas in more detail elsewhere (Young 2007).   
 
Durkheim 
As a sociologist rather than a philosopher of science, Durkheim’s 
theory of knowledge is broader than Bachelard’s; he does not limit 
himself to the physical sciences and he does not differentiate between 
scientific knowledge and knowledge in any broader sense. The 
differences that he identifies between knowledge and experience can 
be traced back to his early rejection of Kant’s transcendentalism and 
to the concepts- ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’- that he developed in his 
studies of religion in primitive societies.  Durkheim initially used the 
sacred/profane distinction to describe the separation of religion and 
everyday life that he found in primitive societies. However the 
‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’  became, for Durkheim,  a basic distinction 
at the heart of all societies, even those that have become largely 
secularized.  He saw the distinction as a form of social organization  
that was basic to science and intellectual thought; hence his reference 
to primitive religions ‘proto-sciences’.  Without the conceptual and 
social moves from the everyday world of survival to the sacred world 
of totemic religion that those early societies made,  Durkheim argued, 
no science and no knowledge , and indeed no society, would be 
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possible.  
 
Vygotsky 
Entering adult life and beginning his short career at the start of the 
Soviet Revolution, Vygotsky inevitably focused on the immediate  
problems facing teachers in the new society.   His primary concern 
was with how teachers could help students to  develop the higher 
order concepts that they would not have access to in their everyday 
lives. Like Durkheim, his theory was about the differentiation of 
knowledge and he also relied on a binary distinction- between two 
kinds of concepts- the theoretical (or scientific) and the everyday.  
The task of the curriculum- and schooling more generally, for 
Vygotsky, was to provide students with access to theoretical concepts 
in all their different forms- from history and literature to the sciences 
and mathematics. Furthermore,  he saw that  access to higher order 
concepts was not a simple one-way process of transmission but a 
complex pedagogic process in which a learner’s everyday concepts 
are extended and transformed by theoretical concepts.  From the point 
of the role of knowledge in education, the implications of Vygotsky’s  
ideas are most clearly expressed in the work of the Russian Vasily 
Davidoff and his ideas of ‘kernel knowledge’ and learning as moving 
beyond the abstract and gaining a grasp of the concrete ‘real’ nature 
of things.    
  21 
 
Bernstein  
Bernstein (Bernstein1971:  2000)11 took Durkheim’s ideas of 
knowledge differentiation further in a number of important ways. 
Here I will only refer to three brief points which focus on the issue of 
knowledge differentiation.  
 • With his concepts of ‘classification’ and ‘framing’ Bernstein 
developed Durkheim’s  idea of  boundaries as the key social 
category separating types of  symbolic meanings. He used these 
concepts to show how boundaries in education play a major role in 
the development of  learner and teacher identities.   
 • Bernstein  distinguished two types of educational boundary 
that are crucial for any curriculum theory-those between 
knowledge domains and those between school and everyday 
knowledge. He analysed the implications of both these types of  
boundary being blurred or dissolved.     
 • Bernstein   drew on Durkheim’s concepts of the ‘sacred’ and 
the ‘profane’ and his argument that the ‘sacred’ represented a kind 
of ‘proto-science’ to develop a  distinction between forms of the 
‘sacred’ which he expressed as vertical and horizontal discourses.  
In his last work (Bernstein 2000)  he began to  analyse the 
curriculum implications of these distinctions.                                                          11 I have only referred to two of Bernstein’s many pubications here.  
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Forms of knowledge differentiation and the curriculum 
In this section I want to comment briefly on five aspects of the social 
differentiation of knowledge that can be derived from the ideas of 
Durkheim, Vygotsky and Bernstein and suggest that they could provide 
the basis for a theory of the curriculum that is based on the idea of the  
‘voice of knowledge’.  Although aspect each has a distinct focus, there 
are overlaps between them and further conceptual clarification could no 
doubt reduce the number of types listed and define them more precisely.  
 
 • the fundamental difference between knowledge and 
experience – 
Without this difference, which lies at the heart of Durkheim’s 
social theory of knowledge, the idea of a curriculum is impossible. 
This has been demonstrated by the failed attempts of successive 
generations of progressive and radical educators to collapse the 
categories and  construct an experience-based curriculum. The 
problems of the South African and Australian outcomes –based 
curricula, the English child-centred curriculum that followed 
Plowden and the more radical Queensland-based ‘new basics 
curriculum’ are among the many examples.  Less publicized,  but 
in social justice terms, even more damaging is the extent to which 
curricula based on the  work experience of young people  have 
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been the basis of a wide range of vocational programmes which 
claim to offer educational possibilities to slow learners and those 
disaffected from schooling.  
 
The conceptual separation of knowledge from experience was 
Durkheim’s major point in his most explicitly philosophical book 
Pragmatism and Sociology (Durkheim 1984) . In that book  he 
praised William James and the pragmatists for bringing 
philosophical questions  about truth back to where he felt they  
should be located- in social life (or as he expressed it, in society)  
and not in academic philosophy.  However he criticized James and 
the pragmatists  for having an undifferentiated concept of the social 
and society and therefore at least implicitly equating it with 
experience.  For Durkheim experience is a powerful force but 
inadequate  as an epistemological principle and no basis for reliable 
knowledge or for the curriculum.  
 
 • the differences between theoretical and everyday knowledge  
This is a narrower and more concrete expression of the first 
difference.  If these differences are dismissed of blurred, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to make reliable decisions about 
what to include and exclude in the curriculum or indeed to say 
what formal education is for. There are two possible consequences 
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of blurring the distinction between theoretical and everyday 
concepts. The first is that many kinds of knowledge are included in 
the curriculum, for broadly political reasons,  which schools may 
not provide the conditions for acquiring- sex and moral education 
and employment–related skills are examples. The second 
consequence is that the contents that may be the condition for 
acquiring theoretical knowledge are excluded or replaced (as in the 
recent proposals for the secondary science curriculum in England).  
Thus on the grounds of popular relevance or pupil interest, the 
opportunities that students have for acquiring systematic theoretical 
knowledge that can not be acquired elsewhere are restricted.  
 
Without a specification of the differences between theoretical and 
everyday concepts as well as  a focus on the relationships between 
them  that go beyond the moral or political standpoints of those 
involved, curriculum decisions are inevitably reduced to politics.  
 
 • the differences between knowledge domains 
These differences refer to horizontal aspects of the intellectual 
division of labour in Durkheim’s terms and what Bernstein 
describes as the classification of educational knowledge. A theory 
of knowledge differentiation presupposes that domain differences 
are not arbitrary but in some degree are  the product of Bachelard’s 
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historical processes of ‘rectification and critique’.   An 
understanding of  the extent to which  domain differences such as 
those between disciplines and subjects have an epistemological as 
opposed to a merely conventional basis is crucial to the analysis of 
the links between domain boundaries, learner identities, and learner 
progress and to addressing the debate around multi-, trans- and 
inter-disciplinarity and the limits of modularization and student 
choice.  
 
 • the differences between school and non-school knowledge 
These differences follow from Vygotsky’s distinction between 
theoretical and everyday concepts and my interpretation of 
Bernstein’s concept of the framing of educational knowledge. 
However the differences between  school and non-school 
knowledge have a specific importance in that they indicate why it 
is important to  distinguish between the curriculum- as the 
conditions for acquiring new knowledge, and pedagogy- which 
refers to the activities of teaching and learning involved in the 
process of acquisition. This is a distinction that both Durkheim and 
Bernstein were somewhat ambiguous about. Both, but explicitly 
Durkheim, relied on an over-deterministic transmission model of 
education which played down the active role of the learner in 
transmission and   the extent to which the recontextualisation of 
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school knowledge lies at the heart of pedagogy12. Vygotsky, on the 
other hand was more sensitive to the complexity of pedagogic 
issues,   but was less explicit about exactly what he meant by 
theoretical (or scientific) concepts. This maybe why the socio-
cultural and socio historical activity theories of learning which 
locate their origins in Vygotsky’s work have largely neglected  the 
role of knowledge in formal education.  From the perspective being 
developed in this paper, while pedagogy necessarily involves the 
teacher in taking account of the non-school knowledge that her/his 
students bring to school, the curriculum explicitly does not.  
 
 
Conclusions  
This paper began by noting the emptying of the concept of 
knowledge in the increasingly  globalised debates about education 
and the knowledge economy and explored some of the  
implications of this trend  in contemporary educational policy. In 
endeavouring to  recapture  knowledge as lying at the heart of the goals of all education, the idea of the ‘voice of knowledge’  does not divorce knowledge from knowers and hence from thinking and judgment. Rather it  offers a counter to this                                                         12 Bernstein was the originator of  the concept of ‘recontextualisation’;  however he was more concerned with its role in the structuring of pedagogic discourse than as a way of conceptualising pedagogy.  
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divorce in much  contemporary writing where thinking and learning are treated as if they were processes that can be conceptualised as educational goals independently of what the thinking and learning is about.   
I have argued that the idea of the structured differentiation of knowledge 
is central to a more adequate conceptualization of its role in education. 
The paper focused primarily on the differentiation of school and non-
school knowledge and discussed some of the dimensions of this 
differentiation and  their educational significance. The growth of 
knowledge, whether in a subject like physics or history, or in an 
occupational field  like engineering or financial management,  and hence 
the opportunities for acquisition open to new learners whatever their age, 
will depend on the continued process of ‘rectification and critique’, to 
return to Bachelard’s apt phrase, by the various specialists involved. 
Making this process explicit is the task of a realist sociology of 
knowledge in relation to the curriculum,  if the ‘voice’ of knowledge’ is 
to shape educational policy and  knowledge is not to continue to be an 
empty category. There is much to do.  
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